This Article is part of the first comprehensive study examining the use of class action adversary proceedings 12 to curb systematic overreaching by creditors in bankruptcy. 13 Class actions have long been promoted as a solution to the problem of small value consumer claims, as they permit litigants to bring claims that are uneconomical to litigate on an individual basis. 12. Adversary proceedings are civil actions brought in connection with a bankruptcy case. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001; 10-7001 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7001.01. I refer to class action adversary proceedings brought by debtor classes as "debtor class actions" throughout this Article.
13. The first article in this series, The Debtor Class, considered threshold jurisdictional concerns that have troubled courts and perhaps deterred debtors from pursuing aggregate claims in bankruptcy. See Bruce, supra note 4.
14. Id. at 40 (collecting authority).
force defendants to internalize some of the costs of their misconduct. 15 In this way, class actions can serve as a valuable complement to bankruptcy's broader regulatory efforts. 16 Class actions also increase transparency, preserve judicial resources, and encourage uniformity and consistency in the application of law. 17 Moreover, bankruptcy courts are well-suited to handle debtor class actions, based on their institutional capacity for handling aggregate claims and addressing consumer protection's goals. 18 Nevertheless, the class action has steadily lost traction in the civil justice system. In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has bolstered businesses' ability to limit their exposure to class litigation through class action waivers contained in consumer arbitration agreements. 19 In particular, the Supreme Court has rejected two equitable challenges to class arbitration waivers, 20 indicating that the strong federal policies underlying the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") "trump[] any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims." 21 In another series of cases, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have heightened the requirements of class certification, limiting the window of cases that can be brought on a classwide basis. 22 This Article clarifies a path for debtor class actions in the modern, anti-class action framework. First, no matter how powerful class arbitration waivers may be outside of bankruptcy, courts have broad discretion to prohibit bankruptcy claims from being resolved in arbitration if arbitration would create an inherent conflict with bankruptcy law or necessarily jeop- Cir. 1988 ) (" [T] he class action provides compensation that cannot be achieved in any other way; although the costs of litigation may consume much of the benefit, the device still serves a deterrent function by ensuring that wrongdoers bear the costs of their activities.").
16. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 40 (discussing the regulatory benefits of private litigation). For a brief discussion and response to predominant critiques of class actions, see id. at 40-42.
17. See id.
18.
See infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
19. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309-10 (2013) (rejecting "effective vindication of statutory rights" challenge to class arbitration waivers); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding unconscionability challenge to class arbitration waiver was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010) (holding arbitration clause that was silent on the issue of class arbitration could not be construed to permit class arbitration).
20. I use the term "class arbitration waivers" to describe any waivers of class action rights that appear in an arbitration agreement.
21. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5. 22. See infra Part IV.
ardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. 23 As a descriptive matter, arbitration of many debtor class action proceedings will likely present an inherent conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. 24 As a normative matter, courts should consider class-killing arbitration clauses as probative evidence of an inherent conflict whenever the clause would preclude debtor classes from effectively vindicating their bankruptcy rights. 25 Second, although the requirements for class certification are rigorous, some of the most troubling debtor class action cases are prime candidates for certification. 26 To be sure, the window of debtor class action cases that can survive these modern challenges is narrow. Nevertheless, in light of the regulatory benefits of class actions, debtors' attorneys, case trustees, and courts should embrace debtor classes to the extent permissible under applicable law. In addition, scholars and lawmakers should consider ways to encourage greater levels of compliance with applicable bankruptcy law and procedure, whether by reviving aspects of the class device or advancing non-class methods of private litigation. 27 Part II begins by describing debtor class actions and the challenges they face. It then focuses on the rise of class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court's embrace of these waivers, and the impact this case law has on small value claims. 28 Part III places these developments in the context of a debtor class action proceeding, arguing that courts can, through application of the "inherent conflict" test, preserve debtor class actions in the face of a class arbitration waiver. 29 In Part IV, this Article argues that modern class certification standards do not completely foreclose debtor class action relief. 30 This Article concludes by observing that class actions can serve as a valuable component of consumer bankruptcy's regulatory structure, and looks forward to additional reforms to encourage compliance with consumer bankruptcy law. 
I. DEBTOR CLASS ACTIONS AND THE CHALLENGES THEY FACE

A. Debtor Class Actions
This series of articles seeks to address a rift between the norms of bankruptcy law and the realities of bankruptcy practice. As noted above, large institutional lenders-some with thousands of borrowers in bankruptcy-may routinely fail to comply with consumer bankruptcy law and procedure. 32 The alarming prevalence of this behavior came to the fore in the wake of the Great Recession, along with the "robo-signing" scandal that exposed similar misconduct in mortgage foreclosure cases. 33 Yet high profile examples preceding and following the foreclosure crisis indicate that this problem is not limited to mortgage lenders and servicers and likewise has not been resolved. 34 Some cases of lender noncompliance in bankruptcy arise from understaffing, institutional sloppiness, or the use of bookkeeping software that is not designed to accommodate the bankruptcy process. 35 Others suggest a more calculated departure from the requirements of bankruptcy law and procedure. 36 Whatever their origin, the actions or inactions of creditors in bankruptcy can disadvantage competing claimants to the debtor's limited pool of assets, or may jeopardize the debtor's pursuit of a fresh start. 37 Moreover, although some of these issues have been highly publicized and have resulted in enforcement 38 and law reform 39 efforts, lender noncompliance persists. 40 32. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text; Bruce, supra note 4, at 25-30 (collecting additional examples).
33. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 25-28 (describing pervasive under-compliance with bankruptcy and foreclosure law by mortgage lenders and servicers).
34. See supra note 5 (highlighting recent examples); Bruce, supra note 4, at 28-30 (highlighting examples not related to the Great Recession).
35. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 4, at 28; Alan M. White, Losing the Paper-Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 469-70 (2012) (describing mortgage lenders' documentation shortcuts, such as "assembly-line signing and notarizing of affidavits for foreclosure cases, mortgage assignments, note allonges and related documents" known generally as "robo-signing").
36. See, e.g., In re Stewart, 391 B.R. 327, 355-57 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2008) (sanctioning mortgage servicer for inflating proofs of claim with fees for excessive drive-by property inspections, inspections on property other than the debtor's, and two broker price opinions that were allegedly conducted when the property was inaccessible to civilians in the wake of Hurricane Katrina).
37. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 34. 38. See id. at 35 (discussing efforts by the U.S. Trustee Program, federal and state agencies, and individual bankruptcy judges to address such abuse).
39. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (amending the proof-of-claim filing rules to require, among other things, an itemization of interest, fees, expenses, and other charges claimed, as well as the amount necessary to cure a default and, if the lien is on the debtor's principal residence, provide an escrow statement as of the petition date); id. at 3002.1 (requiring holders of mortgage claims to provide notice before a change in the amount of mortgage payments, as well as notices
In the first article in this series, The Debtor Class, I explored the use of class action adversary proceedings as a complement to bankruptcy's regulatory structure and an added check on lender conduct. 41 As other scholars have observed, the evidence of sloppiness and overreaching in the bankruptcy arena suggests that large consumer lenders may lack sufficient incentives to comply with bankruptcy law and procedure in consumer bankruptcy cases. 42 Consumer bankruptcy features numerous layers of protection from abuse-including the presence of a case trustee, the oversight of a United States Trustee Program, and the bankruptcy courts' statutory and inherent powers to address wrongdoing 43 -but each of these entities is poorly positioned to discover small but pervasive incidences of lender misconduct. 44 Moreover, even if a debtor or her attorney discovers the abuse, it might not be economically feasible to challenge the practices. 45 A robust threat of class actions may provide a deterrent stopgap at a lower institutional cost, fill in the gaps that remain from existing enforcement efforts, and deter future wrongful conduct.
46
In many ways, bankruptcy is an ideal forum for consumer class actions to flourish. First, the bankruptcy system has a long history of furthering the goals of consumer financial protection. William Whitford has argued that of the fees, expenses, or charges incurred post-petition that the claimant asserts are recoverable from the debtor).
40. To date, the national mortgage settlement is the most significant enforcement effort of bankruptcy misconduct. See About the Settlement, JOINT STATE-FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENTS, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). Yet it has become increasingly clear that violations of bankruptcy law remain, and the mortgage lenders and servicers subject to the settlement have not followed it to the letter. See Danielle Douglas, Some Big Banks Are Still Violating the National Mortgage Settlement, Report Says, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/some-big-banksare-still-violating-the-national-mortgage-settlement-report-says/2013/12/04/02b4091a-5d1b-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.html; Bruce, supra note 4, at 35 (cataloguing early evidence of noncompliance with new Bankruptcy Rules). Moreover, reports of lenders' failure to clean credit reports and other foreclosure practices suggest that these problems will continue. See SilverGreenberg, supra note 5; Gretchen consumer bankruptcy has accomplished more than other reforms-small claims courts and low-cost legal assistance, for example-to help consumers obtain relief with respect to disputed debts. 47 Indeed, because of bankruptcy's relative affordability and effectiveness, Whitford dubbed consumer bankruptcy "a primary vehicle for delivering the elusive goal of consumer justice." 48 Relatedly, bankruptcy's layers of oversight, while insufficient to target all bankruptcy abuse, have been fairly effective at catching egregious lender misconduct. For example, the United States Trustee Program's investigation of bankruptcy misconduct played a central role in bringing to light the abuses of mortgage lenders and servicers during the worst of the foreclosure crisis. 49 Second, in addition to consumer bankruptcy's role in furthering consumer protection, bankruptcy courts have the procedural capacity to handle aggregate actions. ruptcy courts' subject matter jurisdiction of a class of debtors and motions to compel arbitration of the proceedings.
52
B. Jurisdictional Challenges to Debtor Class Actions
The very concept of a debtor class action may seem, at first blush, to be fundamentally at odds with bankruptcy's debtor-focused jurisdictional scheme. 53 Indeed, many courts have balked at asserting jurisdiction over a nationwide class of debtors, based on bankruptcy's policy of centralizing all claims of or against a single debtor in bankruptcy court. 54 In The Debtor Class, I explain how many such initial reactions to debtor class actions are misplaced. 55 While a strong policy of centralization indeed forms the heart of bankruptcy jurisdiction, adversary proceedings are treated with a greater amount of flexibility. In contrast to federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and property of the estate, 56 jurisdiction over proceedings that arise in bankruptcy is nonexclusive 57 and subject to transfer to state or federal courts in a variety of circumstances.
58
Courts that have rejected debtor class actions based on jurisdictional concerns fall largely into three categories. The first category reads into bankruptcy's jurisdictional framework a requirement that an adversary proceeding bear some relationship or "nexus" to the representative debtor's case. 59 The second category focuses on bankruptcy courts' exclusive juris- 60 finding this language requires the "home court" to handle any proceedings that arise in the debtor's case. 61 The third category concerns cases in which the court must exercise its contempt power, typically to punish violations of the automatic stay or discharge injunction. 62 Under those circumstances, some courts conclude that the dispute at issue must be resolved by the court that issued the relevant injunction.
63
The Debtor Class considers and rejects each of these challenges to class action adversary proceedings. It concludes that the first category misanalyses relevant law. 64 While the second and third categories of cases reach more plausible conclusions under the bankruptcy jurisdictional statutes, either the analysis is problematic, or it is equally or more compelling to interpret bankruptcy's jurisdictional provision to permit jurisdiction over a nationwide debtor class. 65 In sum, The Debtor Class finds few meaning- ful jurisdictional limitations on debtor class action adversary proceedings in bankruptcy.
C. Arbitration Agreements as a Shield to Class Action Liability
The typical debtor class action adversary proceeding features a class of debtors seeking relief against a common creditor. If the underlying debtorcreditor relationship is governed by an agreement containing an arbitration clause, a creditor might seek to compel arbitration of the proceeding.
66
Creditors may seek arbitration because they believe that the arbitral forum will be more convenient or produce a more favorable result. 67 As discussed in this Part, however, creditors may instead rely on arbitration clauses as a tool to avoid class action liability.
The Liberal Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration
Over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored that the FAA creates a "liberal federal policy" in favor of arbitration. 68 Although the FAA originally governed negotiated agreements between sophisticated business parties, 69 over time, the Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to hold that it applies to consumer adhesion contracts and employment agreements, that it affects statutory rights, that it applies in state courts, and that it preempts conflicting state laws. 70 [P] arties are largely free to specify by contract the procedures governing their arbitration. The Court has even suggested that they may be free to specify by contract the remedies the arbitrator may award, specifically, whether punitive damages are available in arbitration.").
73. Glover, supra note 71, at 1743; see also CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS 6 (2013) [hereinafter "CFPB STUDY"] ("[C]ourts regularly enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer, employment, and other contexts in which the relevant contract is not subject to negotiation between the contracting parties.").
Class Arbitration Waivers
Since the late 1990s, consumer arbitration clauses have increasingly contained waivers of the right to aggregate claims into a class action proceeding. 74 Such waivers can be very expansive, foreclosing any aggregation of claims, whether inside or outside the arbitral forum.
75 Some scholars believe the avoidance of aggregate proceedings is a primary reason companies include arbitration provisions in consumer financial contracts.
76
Professors Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin studied a sample of twenty-six consumer and 164 nonconsumer contracts used by large public corporations, finding that "large companies [in the study's sample] overwhelmingly selected arbitration as the method for resolving consumer disputes [but] permitted litigation as the method for resolving business disputes."
77 Indeed, seventy-five percent of the consumer contracts in the study's sample contained arbitration provisions, while arbitration provisions appeared in only around six percent of negotiated business contracts. 78 Moreover, class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts seemed essential to the existence of these arbitration agreements. 79 Of the consumer contracts with arbitration clauses, one hundred percent prohibited class arbitration, and eighty percent contained a waiver of other class litigation rights. 75. See, e.g., CFPB STUDY, supra note 73, at 13 (noting that the terms of arbitration clauses studied "effectively preclude all class proceedings, in court or in arbitration").
76. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 71, at 1736-37 ("Corporations . . . have increasingly sought to channel [consumer] claims to arbitration, while at the same time denying claimants the right to proceed through class actions."); Amy J. Schmitz Id. at 884. These findings align with the CFPB's study on consumer arbitration clauses. CFPB STUDY, supra note 73, at 37 ("Almost all of the arbitration clauses studied contained terms limiting class proceedings."); CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 2:45 ("[C]lass arbitration was unavailable for 99.9% of arbitration-subject credit card loans outstanding, 97.1% of arbitration-subject insured deposits, essentially 100.0% of arbitration-subject prepaid card loads, 98.2% clauses, which voided the arbitration clause if class procedures were allowed. 81 Based on these findings, the authors observed that "[t]he growth of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses appears to be part of a broader initiative by corporations to preclude or limit aggregate litigation." 82 This conclusion finds further support in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's recent study of consumer arbitration clauses, which found that corporations rarely seek to enforce arbitration agreements in individual suits, but commonly move to compel arbitration to block a class action. 
The Supreme Court's Rejection of Equitable Challenges to Class Arbitration Waivers
The proliferation of arbitration agreements in consumer contracts has drawn the attention of many scholars and commentators, who hotly debate the impact of a strong pro-arbitration policy on the vindication of consumer rights. 84 Critics of consumer arbitration agreements highlight, in particular, the impact of class arbitration waivers on negative-value consumer claims. 85 The class action process has historically been used as a means for individuals to pursue claims that are too small to litigate on an individual basis. 86 If the right to aggregate claims in a class-wide procedure is unavailable, small-value claimants may not have the resources to challenge wrongful conduct. 87 As Judge Posner memorably quipped, " [t] he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero indiof arbitration-subject payday loan storefronts, and 99.7% of arbitration-subject mobile wireless subscribers").
81 andatory' arbitration-arbitration imposed by pre-dispute clauses in contracts of adhesion which, as a practical matter, the nondrafting parties have no real power to avoid or disapprove-will, if allowed to continue unchecked, largely deprive American courts of the ability to play the important social role they played so effectively throughout the last century."), with Cole, supra note 71, at 469 ("[N]umerous empirical studies of arbitration demonstrate that consumer arbitration agreements typically provide consumers with fair and affordable access to justice.").
85. See Glover, supra note 71, at 1737 (" [W] here the expected recovery does not justify the cost of a stand-alone claim . . . corporations have the greatest incentive to write class action waivers into mandatory arbitration provisions."). vidual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30."
88 Thus, class arbitration waivers could provide businesses the opportunity to violate consumers' rights with impunity. 89 Critics also argue that arbitration may eliminate the procedural protections of a judicial forum, decrease transparency, and obscure the development of precedent.
90
Some consumers have attempted to challenge the enforceability of class arbitration waivers based upon the barriers to litigation that they create. . California permits a court to refuse to enforce a contract it finds "to have been unconscionable at the time it was made" and further to "limit the application of any unconscionable clause." Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a) (West 2014).
98. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 162-63 (Cal. 2005) (holding "when [a class action] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the par-court's ruling underscored that the class action device is a vital mechanism to vindicate small claims and ensure compliance with the law. 99 Following the California Supreme Court's lead, a number of courts around the country similarly invalidated class action waivers on unconscionability grounds. 100 The Supreme Court took a decisive stance against California's unconscionability doctrine in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.
101 Concepcion involved claims for false advertising and fraud based on AT&T's alleged practice of advertising a cell phone as "free" with a two-year contract.
102
When AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration of the dispute, the plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under California law because it disallowed class-wide procedures. 103 The district court held that the class action waiver was invalid under Discover Bank, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
104
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment, holding that Discover Bank "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" and is thus preempted by the FAA. 105 The Court drew a sharp distinction between bilateral arbitration and arbitration on a class-wide basis, finding the latter ill-suited to the arbitral forum:
Class-wide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties. 106 ty with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . such waivers are unconscionable under California law"). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, argued that the principles advanced in Discover Bank align with both the language and the purpose of the FAA. 108 The dissent challenged the majority's support of bilateral arbitration to the exclusion of class arbitration, noting that "neither the history nor present practice suggests class arbitration is fundamentally incompatible with arbitration itself." 109 The dissent then highlighted the function of the Discover Bank rule in preventing the manipulation of consumer contracts to insulate corporate actors from fraud and argued the state's decision should be respected. ing an individual arbitration action prevents the effective vindication of statutory rights.
114
A class of merchants mounted such a challenge against American Express Company ("American Express"), arguing the company violated the Sherman Act by forcing the merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately thirty percent higher than the fees for competing credit cards. 115 American Express sought to compel individual arbitration of the class members' claims based on a class arbitration waiver in American Express's agreements with the merchants. 116 In response, the merchants asserted the estimated costs for expert analysis to prove the antitrust claims would be "at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million," most of which was non-recoupable, whereas an individual plaintiff's maximum treble-damages recovery would be $38,549.
117 The arbitration costs, the merchants argued, were "plainly prohibitive" of the effective vindication of the merchants' rights. 118 The district court granted American Express's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the lawsuits. 119 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that because the merchants "would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate under the class action waiver," the waiver was unenforceable. 123 and found nothing within the antitrust or class action laws to undermine the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.
124
It acknowledged the existence of an effective-vindication exception but held that the exception applied only to cases in which an arbitration clause amounts to a "prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies."
125 The Court made clear that "the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy."
126 Accordingly, the Court held that arbitration of the matter would not prevent the effective vindication of statutory rights.
127
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, mounted a forceful dissent that characterized the majority opinion as a "betrayal of our precedents, and of federal statutes like the antitrust laws." 128 The dissent found the rejection of the effective-vindication defense improper, as "the principle we have established fits this case hand in glove."
129 Important to the dissent's reasoning was the text of the arbitration agreement, which broadly prohibited not only class aggregation but also "other forms of costsharing . . . that could provide effective vindication." 130 The dissent expressed concern that the majority's holding creates avenues through which a company might, through strategic drafting of arbitration agreements, eliminate any meaningful recourse for its misconduct. The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish an absurd (e.g., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing a claimant from gaining access to the arbitral forum. On the back end: The agreement might remove the arbitrator's authority to grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment gets the claimant nothing worthwhile. And in the middle: The agreement might block the claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is necessary to establish the defendant's liability-say, by prohibiting any economic testimony (good luck proving an antitrust claim without that!). Or else the agreement might appoint as an arbitrator an obviously biased person-say, the CEO of Amex."). [VOL. 75:443 ing the standards for certifying a class, 132 underscore an antipathy to the class device held by a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court. In the few years since Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant were decided, many lower courts have applied this precedent expansively, 133 but some have interpreted the cases in ways that preserve some vitality in the unconscionability and effective-vindication challenges. 134 The reactions of scholars and commentators to this precedent are similarly mixed: some believe that businesses will now flock to arbitration clauses, effectively killing the consumer class action, while others argue that the effects of these decisions will be more muted. 135 The following Part analyzes these issues in the context of debtor class action cases and argues that the effect of this case law should be minimal in the bankruptcy arena. While the FAA's pro-arbitration mandate is strong, it is not absolute, and it must at times give way to countervailing federal interests. 136 The federal interests underlying the Bankruptcy Code have long provided bankruptcy courts substantial discretion to avoid arbitration of matters if arbitration would conflict with bankruptcy's objectives. As such, bankruptcy courts should adjudicate matters subject to a class arbitration waiver when granting arbitration would prevent the vindication of bankruptcy rights.
III. THE FAA AND CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
The prior Part explored the strong federal policies underlying arbitration and the increasing power of class arbitration waivers as a shield to class Under this view of the inherent conflict analysis, it is appropriate for bankruptcy courts to refuse to compel arbitration of matters that would prevent debtor classes from vindicating their bankruptcy rights.
The analysis in this Part, although technical, necessarily paints with a broad brush. Debtor class action cases can present a host of claims, involving bankruptcy law, state or federal consumer protection laws, or other legal rights. Moreover, as discussed below, the standard for determining whether these proceedings are unsuitable for arbitration is fact intensive and highly discretionary. This analysis thus suggests how courts could approach typical or common patterns in debtor class action cases. Considering the role bankruptcy courts have historically played in achieving consumer justice, as well as the salutatory effects that class actions might have on the enforcement of consumer bankruptcy laws, courts should construe their discretion in a manner that enhances the debtor class action.
A. The Limited Force of Class Arbitration Waivers in Bankruptcy
As a preliminary matter, in order for class arbitration waivers to stand as a bar to debtor class action relief, the dispute at issue must be governed by an arbitration agreement that contains a class arbitration waiver. While arbitration clauses are prevalent in a broad range of consumer contracts, 140 they are not pervasive. For example, much standard home loan documentation has historically not included arbitration provisions, given the unwillingness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy certain mortgages loans with arbitration clauses on the secondary market. 141 142 Finally, at the time of this writing, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau ("CFPB") has just completed a major empirical study of the use of arbitration agreements in consumer contracts. 143 The agency is expected to promulgate new regulations on arbitration agreements, which may further reduce the prevalence of class arbitration waivers and curtail the long-term impact of Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant.
144
Even if an arbitration agreement is invoked in a debtor class action case, the scope of the agreement might not be broad enough to encompass bankruptcy-specific harms that debtor classes allege. Although arbitration agreements generally are enforceable in bankruptcy, 145 even when the claims are founded on statutory rights, 146 many bankruptcy-related causes of action are distinct from the underlying contract. The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York acknowledged as much in In re Hostess Brands, Inc. 147 In that case, the court found that issues relating to a corporate debtor's use of cash collateral 148 were not subject to arbitration.
149
Although the underlying contract featured an arbitration agreement that broadly covered "[a]ny controversy, dispute, claim, or question arising out of or relating to this agreement," 150 the court found that the use of cash collateral was a matter "not at all rooted in a right that exists pre-bankruptcy" and was therefore beyond the scope of the arbitration clause. 143. CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 74. 144. A number of state attorneys general have urged the agency to place additional regulations on the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses for financial products or services, stating that they "are concerned about such clauses and the class action prohibitions often associated with them." Letter from Joseph R. Biden discharge in bankruptcy "operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor." 152 Certainly, a debt that has been discharged may have originated from a contract, and the relevant contract might indeed contain an expansive arbitration clause with a class arbitration waiver. 153 But a court might well conclude that the terms of the arbitration clause are not broad enough to encompass the bankruptcy-based claims alleged.
154
B. The FAA's Goals Must, at Times, Yield to Bankruptcy Policy
If an arbitration clause in fact governs issues raised in a debtor class action proceeding, the creditor-defendant might move for the dispute to be resolved in arbitration. 155 As detailed above, many such motions are designed to give effect to class arbitration waivers, 156 and particularly after Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant, moving to compel arbitration might successfully prevent a debtor class from aggregating their claims. 157 Nevertheless, debtor classes have a unique means to challenge arbitration clauses based on the strong federal policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the FAA's pro-arbitration mandate, while strong, "may be overridden by a contrary congressional command."
158 Courts have long viewed matters central to the bankruptcy process to provide such a command. Indeed, bankruptcy courts have broad discretion to refuse to compel arbitration when arbitration of a matter would inherently conflict with bankruptcy law or policy. 159 Courts have exercised this type of discretion in cases in which the interests of other parties to the 152. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (2012 ) ("Although classified as a non-core proceeding, the unique set of facts presented in this case, when considered in the aggregate, compel the Court to the conclusion that arbitration of this dispute would seriously disturb the objectives of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.").
168. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d at 1067 ("Cognizant of the Supreme Court's admonition that, in the absence of an inherent conflict with the purpose of another federal statute, the Federal Arbitration Act mandates enforcement of contractual arbitration provisions, we refuse to find such an inherent conflict based solely on the [core] jurisdictional nature of a bankruptcy the dispute would inherently conflict with bankruptcy's aims. The inherent conflict test is a fact-specific inquiry, and the standard has developed raggedly among the various circuits.
169 Despite well-reasoned calls to reform this standard, neither Congress nor the Court has clarified the proper balance between bankruptcy and arbitration. 170 The Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals focus their inherent conflict inquiry largely on the legal basis of the asserted claims. 171 In these circuits, when a cause of action is derivative of a litigant's bankruptcy rights, "the importance of the federal bankruptcy forum provided by the Code is at its zenith," and the bankruptcy court has "significant discretion to assess whether arbitration would be consistent with the purpose of the [Bankruptcy] Code." 172 In contrast, where a cause of action derives from a debtor's pre-bankruptcy contractual rights, the parties' agreement to arbitrate generally should be respected. 173 In the Fifth Circuit, this standard has 172. Nat'l Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1068-69. In National Gypsum, for example, the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had discretion to resolve a declaratory judgment action regarding whether collection efforts violated section 524(a)'s discharge injunction or the confirmation of the debtor's plan. Id. at 1071. The court noted that the action sought to be arbitrated "was restricted entirely to the adjudication of federal bankruptcy issues" and permitting arbitration of these claims "would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 1070-71; see also In re Gandy, 299 F.3d at 498 (applying the National Gypsum standard to uphold the bankruptcy court's decision to deny arbitration in case where bankruptcy issues predominated and their resolution "implicates matters central to the purposes and policies of the Bankruptcy Code").
173. In In re Mintze, for example, the Third Circuit held that the debtor's claims under The Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and various federal and state consumer-protection laws should be arbitrated. 434 F.3d at 233. In so holding, the Third Circuit reversed the decisions of the bank-developed into a two-part test: whether "the underlying nature of a proceeding derives exclusively from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code" and whether "arbitration of the proceeding conflicts with the purpose of the Code." 174 The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have taken a more fluid and policy-driven approach to the inherent conflict test. These circuits look beyond the origin of claims to determine whether the substance of the dispute mandates resolution in the bankruptcy arena. 175 The Second Circuit, for example, has emphasized that bankruptcy courts must "carefully determine whether any underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code would be adversely affected by enforcing an arbitration clause" based on a "consider[ation of] conflicting policies." 176 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently described the court's task as determining whether core bankruptcy matters are "'substantially' core or truly a function of the bankruptcy process."
177
Courts in these circuits have found a variety of factors relevant to the inherent conflict analysis. These factors principally include bankruptcy's strong policies in favor of centralization, 178 protecting constituents from piecemeal litigation, 179 and permitting the court to enforce its own orders. 178. See, e.g., In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170 (finding an inherent conflict in an adversary proceeding involving the determination whether pre-petition cash advances were debt or equity, based on the need to centralize proceedings in a chapter 11 reorganization).
179. See, e.g., In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d at 1023 ("Arbitration of a creditor's claim against a debtor, even if conducted expeditiously, prevents the coordinated resolution of debtorcreditor rights and can delay confirmation of a plan of reorganization."); In re U.S. Lines, 197 F.3d at 641 ("[T]he bankruptcy court is the preferable venue in which to handle mass tort actions involving claims against an insolvent debtor.").
case a particular legal expertise or familiarity with the facts. 185 The impact any of these factors might have on the analysis varies greatly from case to case.
C. Debtor Class Actions Under the Inherent Conflict Test
Debtor classes have brought a variety of causes of action against their creditors, alleging violations of the Bankruptcy Code, federal and state consumer protection laws, or a blend of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy claims. Some of the most common bankruptcy-based allegations are that (1) creditors violated Section 524's discharge injunction through improper practices involving reaffirmation agreements or other post-discharge debtcollection activities; 186 (2) creditors routinely filed proofs of claim that were inaccurate, 187 contained unlawful fees, 188 or failed to include necessary zation, violation of substantive bankruptcy principles . . . or some other extraordinary interference with or evisceration of bankruptcy policy.").
185. See, e.g., In re Eber, 687 F.3d at 1131 (noting that the bankruptcy court has "special expertise" to determine dischargeability and familiarity with the case at hand); In re Huffman, 486 B.R. at 364 ("Of most concern to the Court is that arbitrators on the roster of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") need not be attorneys, much less attorneys experienced in bankruptcy law. . . . Here, the Court finds that arbitration is not an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation in this forum, given the nature of the bankruptcy issues involved. documentation; 189 and (3) lenders misapplied plan payments or assessed secret fees for collection after discharge. 190 The variety of legal claims, combined with courts' divergent and fact-intensive inherent conflict standards, makes a thorough analysis of the arbitrability of debtor class action claims difficult. Nevertheless, some useful generalizations can be drawn with respect to a prototypical debtor class action case-a case in which a class of consumer debtors sues a common lender for widespread violations of bankruptcy law.
191
Under the Third and Fifth Circuits' inherent conflict analysis, when debtor class action claims involve violations of bankruptcy law, bankruptcy courts' discretion to refuse arbitration is "at its zenith."
192 These courts are almost certain to find an inherent conflict in the typical debtor class action case. In addition, debtor class action claims tend to implicate central bankruptcy policies, which may lead courts in other circuits toward an inherent conflict finding. Consumer bankruptcy is designed to further two policies: to give "the honest but unfortunate debtor" a fresh start and to provide for the fair treatment and distribution of assets to creditors. 193 The conduct in many debtor class actions violates these policies in significant ways. For example, creditors filing inaccurate proofs of claim or collecting undisclosed fees might receive a greater share of the debtor's limited assets vis-à-vis other creditors, in contravention of bankruptcy's distributional policies. This conduct might also undermine the discharge-a hallmark of bankruptcy's fresh-start policy-by leaving debtors in a vulnerable position after bankruptcy. Lenders that misuse reaffirmation agreements, carry hidden costs for collection after bankruptcy, or fail to remove discharged debt on a credit report likewise undermine the discharge by prolonging the debtor's financial instability after the successful conclusion of a bankruptcy case. Congress likely intended these claims, which run to the heart of the bankruptcy process, to be resolved by a bankruptcy court. Many courts have 191. Debtor class actions based on bankruptcy code violations are likely more prevalent, as they have a greater likelihood of passing threshold jurisdictional challenges. While subject matter jurisdiction over debtor classes is becoming less controversial in core matters, courts have acknowledged that non-core, state-law claims present a more difficult case. See, e.g., In re Noletto, 244 B.R. at 857 (distinguishing cases premised on state law because it "changes the issues and jurisdictional posture").
192. In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1068 (5th Cir. 1997).
193. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) ("It is the twofold purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched.").
reached precisely this conclusion and refused to compel arbitration of these matters.
194
A variety of factors might be present in a debtor class action case that could lend additional support to a court's inherent conflict finding. For example, parties in interest have broad rights of intervention in bankruptcy, but would be ineligible to participate in an arbitration proceeding between debtor and creditor. 195 Thus, permitting arbitration could, in some cases, eliminate legal rights that would be available to third parties in bankruptcy. 196 Additionally, the arbitrators appointed might not be attorneys, let alone attorneys with knowledge of bankruptcy law, and might not have the experience to apply the law in a manner consistent with broader bankruptcy policies.
197
One group of debtor class action proceedings-proceedings involving Bankruptcy Code provisions where no express private right of action exists-is particularly ill-suited for arbitration. Courts typically find these claims remediable either through civil contempt sanctions 198 or enforceable by operation of the court's equitable authority under Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. 199 In either case, the means of punishing the alleged ertain fact situations may be expected to bring about fairly consistent results, wherever they are tried. To subject these matters to arbitration, before individuals or tribunals with little or no experience in bankruptcy law or practice, and with little or no concern for the rights and interests of the body of creditors, of which the particular defendant is only one, would introduce variables into the equation which could potentially bring about totally inconsistent results.").
198 201 Courts and commentators have widely recognized that it would be improper to vest an arbitrator with this degree of judicial authority. 202 Indeed, "the ability of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own orders" is an oft-cited factor in an inherent conflict analysis. 203 As such, for claims that seek remedies based on courts' statutory or inherent powers, an inherent conflict is highly likely to be found.
The fact that these claims are brought on a class-wide basis should, in many instances, add further support to the finding of an inherent conflict. In recent debtor class action cases, the allegations of systemic harm are supported by the staggering incidence of such behavior. In some cases, discovery reveals corporate policies or communications that either permitted or encouraged the alleged violations of bankruptcy law. 204 Compelling arbitration of each individual proceeding would fail to capture the broader harms of such conduct on the bankruptcy system as a whole. 205 As such, bankruptcy courts will likely find arbitration unsuitable for claims alleging systematic bankruptcy abuse.
206
One of the few courts to have considered debtor class actions in the context of an inherent conflict analysis, MBNA American Bank v. Hill, improperly found the class-wide nature of the action to weigh against an inherent conflict. 207 In Hill, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found arbitration appropriate because, among other things, the debtor's estate had been fully administered, resolution of her claim would not affect other creditors of the estate, and the debtor had received a fresh start in bankruptcy and was no longer under the protection of the automatic stay. 208 The court then added, "as a purported class action, Hill's claims lack the direct connection to her own bankruptcy case that would weigh in favor of refusing to compel arbitration."
209
This statement misconstrues the inherent conflict standard. The inherent conflict test examines conflicts between bankruptcy law and arbitration, not conflicts between a bankruptcy debtor and her individual case. Moreover, as noted above, debtor class action claims frequently will involve questions of systemic abuse, which demand a comprehensive resolution that likely is not available outside of bankruptcy. The facts of Hill may well have been insufficient to create an inherent conflict. Yet, to the extent Hill stands for the premise that debtor class claims undermine a finding of an inherent conflict, it is wrongly decided.
In sum, a number of factors suggest that courts may find the typical debtor class action case to be unsuitable for arbitration under the inherent conflict test. Although the foregoing discussion focused on debtor classes that allege violations of bankruptcy law, courts have the discretion to find, in appropriate cases, that arbitration of non-bankruptcy causes of action would likewise give rise to an inherent conflict. 210 Yet the outcome of any inherent conflict analysis is uncertain, as courts exercise considerable discretion when applying this test. As one commentator noted, the inherent conflict test is "so vague and malleable that [it] give[s] courts license to do almost anything they want." 211 Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's strong embrace of the FAA in disputes covered by class arbitration waivers, bankruptcy courts might feel pressured to construe the inherent conflict test more narrowly in debtor class action cases than in other contexts.
In light of this uncertainty, the following Section makes the affirmative case that courts should consider debtor classes' ability to vindicate bankruptcy rights as a central factor of McMahon's inherent conflict analysis. If permitting a claim to be resolved in arbitration would eliminate an affordable procedural path for debtor classes to remedy violations of bankruptcy law or otherwise achieve consumer bankruptcy's goals, bankruptcy courts should refuse to compel arbitration of the dispute.
D. Ensuring the Effective Vindication of Bankruptcy Rights Through the Inherent Conflict Analysis
Ordering arbitration of a debtor class action could make it financially infeasible for a class of debtors to find recourse for conduct that violates their bankruptcy rights. Although this reality is most pronounced when compelling arbitration would give effect to a class arbitration waiver, it could conceivably be present if the debtors' up-front costs to a class-wide arbitration proceeding are prohibitive. This Section argues that when ordering arbitration would impede a debtor class's ability to vindicate bankruptcy rights, courts should find that an inherent conflict exists.
As noted above, courts construing the inherent conflict test in bankruptcy must balance the competing federal policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and the FAA. Although the test varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, at its base the inquiry focuses on how arbitrating a matter might interfere with bankruptcy's goals. 212 For example, courts have refused to compel arbitration if arbitration would "make it very difficult for the debtor to attract additional funding . . . , undermine creditor confidence . . . , impose additional costs on the estate, and divert the attention and time of the debtor's management." 213 ("The regime established by the Court of Appeals' decision would require-before a plaintiff can be held to contractually agreed bilateral arbitration-that a federal court determine (and the parties litigate) the legal requirements for success on the merits claim-by-claim and theory-by-theory, the evidence necessary to meet those requirements, the cost of developing that evidence, and the damages that would be recovered in the event of success. Such a preliminary litigating hurdle would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.").
218. Applying the inherent conflict test in this manner is consistent with the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms," 222 this principle has limited applicability in the bankruptcy arena, where the very purpose is to adjust pre-bankruptcy contractual rights to reach a global resolution of a debtor's financial distress. 223 Relatedly, the FAA's policies are designed to protect the interests of parties that have contracted for arbitration, but bankruptcy is a multi-party enterprise involving a variety of interests beyond the interests of parties to a given arbitration clause. 224 Although the FAA's freedom-ofcontract principles have been strongly supported by the Supreme Court, the Court also developed the inherent conflict test to address precisely these types of policy conflicts. Properly applied, the inherent conflict test should permit arbitration to prevail over issues that are essentially two-party disputes and that do not affect the bankruptcy case, and find that bankruptcy trumps the FAA for matters that bear directly on bankruptcy's goals.
In both Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant, however, the majority of the Court not only promoted arbitration, but derided class-wide arbitration as slower and less efficient than traditional arbitration. 225 Yet it does not follow that bankruptcy court resolution of debtor class claims will be similarly inefficient. The bankruptcy process, like traditional arbitration, is well-suited to handle claims quickly and with minimal litigation costs. 226 balance the policy in favor of arbitration against the policy in favor of consolidated and expedited bankruptcy resolution").
222 (1996) . Bankruptcy's effect on contract rights can be observed in a number of instances, such as the avoidance of prepetition transfers, the assumption or rejection of executory contracts, the invalidation of ipso facto clauses, and the discharge itself. See 11 U.S.C. § § 324 he switch from bilateral to class arbitration . . . sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment." (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751)).
226. Stephen J. Ware, Similarities Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy Litigation, 11 NEV. L.J. 436, 438 (2011) (noting bankruptcy litigation "tends to move more quickly than nonbankruptcy litigation, with a shortened discovery process and an earlier hearing," leading to lower process costs).
Moreover, unlike arbitration panels, bankruptcy courts have extensive experience dealing with massive cases and may have some expertise with class certification standards. 227 Thus, to the extent businesses contract for arbitration to realize the benefits of efficiency and speed, these goals may be satisfied in bankruptcy class action adversary proceedings.
In sum, it is consistent with both the language and the spirit of Supreme Court precedent to revive effective vindication's financial considerations in the context of McMahon's inherent conflict analysis. In so doing, if arbitration would undermine a debtor class's ability to vindicate bankruptcy rights, an inherent conflict should be found. Although determining whether bankruptcy rights would be undermined by arbitration is a fact-intensive consideration, the presence of a class arbitration waiver, prohibitive arbitration costs, or other impediments that affect bankruptcy's aims would seem to indicate that an inherent conflict exists. 228 Accordingly, purported classes must satisfy Rule 23's requirements of numerosity, 229 commonality, 230 typicality, 231 and adequacy of representation, 232 as well as one or more of Rule 23(b)'s requirements, 233 to be certified. Over the last several years, federal courts have ratcheted up the evidentiary standards for class certification, requiring more proof at the class certification stage than previously required. 234 In addition, a line of recent decisions has made various elements of certification markedly more difficult to achieve. 235 As a result, lenders' attorneys have multiple avenues to prevent certification in debtor class action cases.
236
But despite these trends, many debtor class actions may be able to run the gantlet of modern class certification. 237 Indeed, the most troubling examples of lender behavior in bankruptcy involve violations of debtors' rights as a general business practice or matter of policy. 238 Quite frequently, examples of overreaching take the form of a routine assessment of fees, form agreement, or other standardized practice or procedure. 239 These types of claims are well-suited to satisfy even the stringent certification standards of modern class actions.
A thorough analysis of the certification of debtor class claims, particularly in light of the variety of potential debtor class causes of action, exceeds the scope of this Article. This Part instead addresses, in general terms, how debtor class actions may fare under modern class certification requirements. First, few debtor class action cases will have trouble meeting the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a). 240 Large lenders often have hundreds of customers in bankruptcy proceedings at any given time, 241 and abusive practices might go on for years before they are discovered or class action remedies are sought. 242 These classes are also ascertainable, as bankruptcy court dockets are publically available, and counsel can easily search for cases in which a certain lender was a party. 243 The typicality and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a) present no unique issues in debtor class action cases.
The commonality requirement may pose challenges for certain debtor classes, particularly in the wake of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. 244 In Dukes, the Supreme Court found that a class of 1.5 million current and former female Wal-Mart employees, who alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, failed to establish commonality. 245 The Court noted that "'[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common "questions"-even in droves-but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.'" 246 After Dukes, courts tend to look for a common conduct, policy, or practice that underlies the claims of putative class members in order to find the commonality factor satisfied. 247 As noted above, in many debtor class action cases, the harm alleged is premised on standard forms, routine practices, or other systematic conduct by large, institutional lenders. 248 In some cases, policy manuals or written instructions delineate the abusive conduct. 249 For matters premised on federal bankruptcy laws, choice-of-law issues will infrequently arise. 250 Even in cases in which individualized issues exist, 251 a flawed process for handling cases might provide the necessary commonality. In In re Brannan, for example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama certified a class of debtors who sought to enjoin Wells Fargo from preparing unreliable affidavits to support relief from stay motions. 252 Although the impact of this behavior varied across the class-notably, many affidavits, although "robo-signed," were factually correct-the court found common issues to be present. 253 "If every affidavit was prepared pursuant to a tainted process, every affidavit was untrustworthy at the time the court and debtors relied on it." 254 For these reasons, even under Dukes' "rigorous" standard, commonality in debtor class actions may be found.
Most debtor class action cases that have achieved class certification have done so under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that the defendant "has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate."
255
Cases that allege systematic misconduct have achieved certification under this standard when they seek a broad injunction that covers a common conduct in a wide range of cases. 256 While money damages are theoretically available under this provision, Dukes makes clear that they must be incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought. 257 Many such litigants have declined to seek individualized damages or disgorgement, as measuring such damages complicates the certification inquiry. 258 Debtor classes may seek damages under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits money damages in cases in which "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members," and a class-wide resolution is "superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." 259 After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, however, it has arguably become more difficult to certify cases in which individual questions of damages predominate. 260 In Comcast, a class of cable service subscribers sought damages for alleged antitrust violations by their cable provider. 261 The plaintiffs' model for calculating damages was based, in part, on theories of liability that had been rejected at the lower court level. 262 The Court underscored that courts must undertake a "rigorous analysis" of Rule 23's standards and indicated the predominance requirement cannot be satisfied where "[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class."
263 Because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that damages were "susceptible of measurement across the entire class," the Court reversed the lower courts' orders permitting certification. 264 Four dissenting Justices took pains to underscore that "the opinion breaks no new ground on the standard for certifying a class action . . . [and] should not be read to require . . . that damages attributable to a classwide injury be measurable on a class-wide basis." 265 Yet courts have struggled to define the reach of Comcast, particularly outside the context of antitrust suits. 266 Recent court decisions have changed the landscape of certification, but have not eliminated the need for relief from widespread lender noncompliance in consumer bankruptcy cases. Class actions can compensate affected debtors and serve as a valuable regulatory check on lender behavior. Moreover, debtor class action claims appear well-suited to survive under modern certification standards. 274 In light of the regulatory benefits of class litigation, as well as the role of bankruptcy courts in furthering consumer financial protection, debtors' attorneys should embrace class-wide litigation in bankruptcy. Courts should likewise apply the certification standards as liberally as precedent permits.
V. CONCLUSION
Addressing lender overreaching in consumer bankruptcy cases is no easy task. Despite the existence of clear legal and procedural rules, as well as the oversight of the bankruptcy judge, case trustee, and a variety of bankruptcy professionals, large lenders persist in violating the bankruptcy law and debtors' rights in consumer bankruptcy cases. Debtor class actions, if used expansively, might provide a threat sufficient to alter lenders' decision making, encouraging greater levels of compliance than currently exists. Looking forward, as class action precedent increasingly bars consumers from asserting small value claims outside of the bankruptcy arena, bankruptcy could conceivably rise in prominence as a potential outlet for these consumer harms to be addressed. 275 Bankruptcy class actions are an attractive solution to the problems identified in this Article principally because they require no new institutional resources or law reform measures to be effective. As such, bankruptcy attorneys, case trustees, and courts can embrace the debtor class action to encourage greater levels of compliance with bankruptcy and related consumer protection law than currently exists. Nevertheless, the debtor class action should not be pursued to the exclusion of other solutions. In particular, the work of the United States Trustee Program, individual bankruptcy judges, and case trustees has been essential to bringing past lender and servicer misconduct to light. This work should continue. In addition, scholars and lawmakers should explore new law reform measures, including addressing the prudence of modern barriers to class actions and advancing non-class forms of private litigation, to further close consumer bankruptcy's enforcement gap.
